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Greg Musso 
AWR Intellectual Property 
Professor Barnes 
Let the Beat Drop: The Use of Recorded Music in Political Campaigns  
 
Most audiences would prefer to let the beat go on but in certain situations the musicians 
must disagree.  One such scenario is the use of previously recorded songs by political campaigns.  
Artists have objected to the use of their music being played during rallies and in association with 
candidates through visual presentations, such as Youtube videos.1  As the American system of 
copyright law only protects economic rights of musicians, the fair compensation of an artist for 
use of their work, rather than moral rights, the objection by an artist to the particular use of a 
work, copyright law is unable to provide the remedies artists seek when their works are used by 
political campaigns.  Several examples of such conflicts have occurred in the last five years.  
However, most have been settled confidentially, resulting in a minimum of legal precedent.2  
The few decisions that have been reached are partial and ambiguous, met with a lack of 
consensus in the federal courts.    
 This commentary will be confined to the use of previously recorded music in the context 
of rallies and visual presentations.  Several high profile disputes have arisen from political 
campaigns over the past five years.  The McCain/Palin presidential campaign drew several 
complaints from musicians regarding their use of music, specifically, the band Heart 
(“Barracuda”), John Mellencamp (“Pink Houses”), Van Halen (“Right Now”) and John Hall 
(“Still the One”).3   These complaints focused on songs played at rallies which will be a narrow 
focus of this commentary.  We will restrict our investigation to the use of recorded, copyrighted 
                                                          
1 Robert W. Clarida, Andrew P. Sparkler, Singing the Campaign Blues Politicians Often Tone Deaf to Songwriters' 
Rights, 3 LANDSLIDE 6, 7  (2010). 
2 Id. at 7. 
3 Id. at 7-9. 
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music played in a traditional venue, such as an auditorium or convention center, which is played 
at a time when the focus of the rally or appearance is trained on the candidate, such as an 
introduction before or a departure after a speech.  Restricting our sample set in this manner 
eliminates extraneous questions of law regarding the requirement of licenses under copyright law 
for non-traditional venues and the question of Youtube videos under false endorsement 
trademark law (although we will discuss Youtube as precedent for trademark law related to 
campaign appearances). 
Our thesis to be proven or disproven will be that the current legal structure of copyright 
and trademark law is unable to protect artists from exploitation for political gain and therefore a 
new law is necessary.  After evaluating the current recourse available to musicians, this 
commentary will evaluate the impact upon all concerned parties by the net-benefit theory of 
economics to evaluate the incentives, and propose new legislation to solve this problem.  
However, due to our government structure, it is difficult to foresee how elected officials would 
voluntarily enact such legislation.  Indeed, it is unclear any legal action should be taken to solve 
this impasse.  
In Part I, we will discuss the failure of current legal protections in terms of challenges 
musicians must overcome in order to prevent political campaigns from using their previously 
recorded music.  Part II will analyze the problem under the net benefit theory of intellectual 
property law, evaluating the benefits to be gained by both candidates and musicians.  Part III will 
weigh these benefits and determine whether new legislation is warranted and how a new law 
would control this dispute. 
I. The Failure of Legal Protections 
A. Copyright Law Does Not Protect the Moral Rights of Musicians 
B. Trademark Law Has Failed to Protect False Endorsement 
C. First Amendment Complications 
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i. First Amendment’s Impact on Copyright 
ii. First Amendment’s Impact on Trademark 
II. Net-Benefit Theory Evaluation 
III. Should New Legislation be Created and How It Could Solve The Problem 
 
I.The Failure of Existing Law 
A.Copyright Law Does Not Protect the Moral Rights of Musicians 
 The foundation of this problem lies in copyright law.  Musicians expect copyright law to 
protect their work from unlicensed use, but there is no need to obtain a license from each artist in 
order to play their music.  Publisher’s rights organizations (PRO), such as ASCAP, BMI, and 
SESAC enter into contracts with musicians  in order to sell performance licenses for their music.  
The most prevalent form of performance license is a blanket license, enabling the purchaser to 
play all of the music under contract by a particular PRO.  These licenses are purchased by 
traditional meeting places such as auditoriums and convention centers and allow these venues to 
play music from the entire of the PRO.  While PRO’s are not required by copyright law, there are 
several benefits to this procedure, such as lower per transaction costs, allowing venues to avoid 
contracting with musicians individually, and a diversification of music played due to the flat-rate 
nature of being able to play a PRO’s entire catalogue after purchasing the license. 4   
In creating these blanket licenses, PRO’s are protecting the only right copyright law 
promises to protect in the interest of musicians; the economic right the musician owns to earn 
compensation for the playing of their music.  The right which is not protected by this tandem of 
copyright law and the blanket license is the moral right of a musician to object to a particular use 
of their work.5  Since copyright law does not consider moral rights of musicians, artists have no 
                                                          
4 See Lauren Bilasz, Copyrights, Campaigns, and the Collective Administration of Performance Rights: A Call To 
End Blanket Licensing of Political Events, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 305,  322-36 (2010). 
5 Carolina Chavez, Copyright’s “Elephant in the Room”: A Realistic Look at the Role of Moral Rights in Modern 
American Copyright, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 125, 127-28  (2008). 
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recourse under copyright to prevent such usage based only on a moral objection.  Campaigns 
claim that after purchasing these licenses that there is no legal basis to object.  Since the current 
copyright law configuration does not protect moral rights, artists can only ask candidates to stop 
using their music during rallies, as was done during the McCain/Palin campaign. 
 As this problem receives more publicity, musicians and their attorneys are exploring 
original arguments to create new interpretations of the law and contracts to PRO’s .  Recently the 
band Rush has advised the campaign of Rand Paul for the Kentucky Senate that “the public 
performance of Rush’s music is not licensed for political purposes: any public venue which 
allows such use is in breach of its public performance license and also liable of copyright 
infringement.”6  This letter did not accompany a lawsuit, but seems to have been an attempt to 
open a new method of recourse within the copyright structure.  No lawsuit or resolution through 
alternative means followed this action.  Any possible contract claims regarding the necessity to 
specify a political use remain to be seen but is unlikely.  However, as a more popular alternative 
to copyright law claims, some musicians have brought trademark claims as a means to close the 
gap left by copyright law. 
B.Trademark Law Has Failed to Protect False Endorsement7 
Due to the failure of copyright law to protect musicians, alternative means of litigation 
have been attempted.  One such approach is to use trademark law as governed by the Lanham 
Act. 8  Though trademark law is capable of protecting individuals from false endorsement, the 
application of this law to instances of political campaigns stretches the boundaries of the law and 
                                                          
6 Letter from Robert A. Farmer, Director of Legal Affairs, Anthem Entertainment Group, to Rand Paul for U.S. 
Senate (May 25, 2010),available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/32872744/Letter-to-Rand-Paul-re-use-of-Rush-
Music. 
7 See Matthew Cursio, Born To Be Used In The USA: An Alternative Avenue For Evaluating Politicians’ 
Unauthorized Use Of Original Musical Performances On the campaign Trail, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 317 
(2011). 
8 See 15 U.S.C.S §§ 1051-1141. 
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such liberal interpretations are split in the federal courts.  For such a claim to succeed, it would 
have to pass two tests: 1) a trademark would have to meet the statutory definition to exist, and 2) 
false endorsement would have to be found under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  In this situation, 
the trademark would be the musician’s reputation. A celebrity can own trademark rights for his 
or her identity or persona, for which he or she has “an economic interest . . . akin to that of” a 
commercial trademark holder.9 
For a mark to be protected under the Lanham Act, the public must be able to (1) 
recognize the mark as identifying the goods or services with which the mark is associated and (2) 
distinguish those goods and services through the mark.10  To qualify as serving those functions, a 
mark must be “inherently distinctive” or acquire “secondary meaning.”  Secondary meaning 
attaches when the mark and the product or business the mark symbolizes “become synonymous 
in the mind of the public, submerging the primary meaning of the [mark] in favor of its meaning 
as a word identifying that [product or] business.”11  Most importantly, trademark law requires a 
trademark to be used in commerce before any right of action becomes available to plaintiffs.12  
This notion of secondary meaning has broad repercussions on the applicability of trademark law 
to false endorsement and an individual’s reputation. 
To succeed on a claim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must 
prove (1) trademark ownership and (2) that the defendant's unauthorized use of the trademark is 
                                                          
9 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining liability under § 43(a) includes 
unauthorized use of trademarks resulting in consumer confusion as to “sponsorship or approval); Brach Van Houten 
Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. For Chi., 856 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. III. 1994)(“[T]he Lanham Act is 
concerned not only with confusion over the source of goods but also with deceptive appearances of approval.”). 
10 See Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000). 
11 See Arrow Fastener Co. v. The Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Whether the mark is entitled to 
protection depends on whether it is inherently distinctive or, if merely descriptive, has acquired ‘secondary 
meaning.”’ (citing Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1190 (1995). 
12 See Dep't of Parks & Rec. v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) 
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likely to cause consumer confusion.13  For our purposes, the second prong begins the challenging 
journey to proving false endorsement.  Courts must determine whether “numerous ordinary 
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of the product in question 
because of the entrance in the marketplace of defendant's mark.”  To evaluate likelihood of 
confusion, the Circuit Courts have developed various tests. The Second Circuit applies the 
following eight factors, which are known as the Polaroid factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) 
degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) proximity of the products; (4) likelihood that the 
trademark holder will “bridge the gap” (i.e. likelihood that trademark holder will enter into the 
market of the alleged infringer); (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in adopting the 
mark; (7) quality of the defendants' product; and (8) sophistication of the buyers.14 
Other circuits have also adopted similar multi-prong evaluations to analyze likelihood of 
confusion.  These factors, however, are not exclusive, and “[o]ther variables may come into play 
depending on the particular facts presented.”15  Liability under the Lanham Act is not limited to 
the misappropriation of a trademark in commercial activities. Though the statutory language of 
the Lanham Act only imposes liability for the unauthorized use of a trademark “in commerce,” 
that phrase is simply a description of federal courts' jurisdiction over acts that Congress may 
regulate pursuant to the Constitution's Commerce Clause.16  
The first major obstacle a musician faces when attempting to sue for trademark 
infringement is for the Court to determine a political organization is a commercial body.  The 
decision reached in United We Stand America was based on the Second Circuit’s finding that the 
                                                          
13 See Comedy, supra note 10, at 595-96. 
14 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs., Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
15 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
16 See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc. 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The 
history and text of the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress's intent to legislate to the 
limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses 
of a trademark.”). 
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political campaign engaged in “services” within the definition of the Lanham Act specifically, 
“in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or 
services.”17  Very few jurisdictions have taken up this interpretation to apply to political 
campaigns, but the United We Stand America court specified certain activities it determined to be 
indicative of services: 
United We Stand America New York was incorporated to 
“solicit, collect and otherwise raise money” in support of the 
presidential candidacy of Ross Perot. Since its incorporation, it has 
engaged in political organizing, established and equipped an 
office; solicited politicians to run on the UWSANY slate; issued 
press releases intended to support particular candidates and causes; 
endorsed candidates; and distributed partisan political literature.18 
 
The Court evaluated these activities to constitute a service within the stream of commerce, 
making the organization subject to the stipulations of the Lanham Act in spite of the fact that 
they were performed on a non-profit basis.  Another case which agrees with this interpretation 
was Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coalition for Chicago, where the court 
held that “a group engaged in soliciting donation, preparing press releases, holding public 
meetings and press conferences, and organizing on behalf of its members’ interests was 
performing services within the meaning of the Lanham Act.”19  Under this interpretation, it is 
possible for political campaigns to be held liable for trademark infringement 
Although we have now seen political campaigns can be held liable for trademark 
infringement, there must be a cause of action under the Lanham Act which will permit musicians 
to sue.  Musicians have begun using section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to bring suit for false 
endorsement.  Under this section, trademark takes on a different meaning than a mark as a means 
                                                          
17 Id. at 89.  
18 Id. at 90. 
19 Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc.  v. Save Brach;s Coalition for Chicago, 856 F.Supp. 472, 475-76 (N.D.  III 
1994).  
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of identifying a brand, but rather in this context a trademark can protect a celebrity’s persona in 
relation to such a persona’s commercial value.   
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act extends liability for trademark misappropriation beyond 
consumer confusion as to source identification for a product but rather to a celebrity’s persona.  
Under Section 43(a), trademark owners are protected against the misappropriation of their 
trademarks if the misappropriation (1) is likely to cause consumer confusion by creating a false 
association with or endorsement by the trademark holder or (2) constitutes false advertising.20  
Certain courts view the intentional confusion of the electorate regarding the source of political 
material to be very dangerous to the political process.21  Courts consider the same likelihood of 
confusion factors when determining liability for false association, endorsement, or advertising as 
they do when determining liability for consumer confusion regarding the source of trademarked 
goods.22  
Lanham Act protections under Section 43(a) are not only invoked by marketplace 
competitors but rather a celebrity can own trademark rights for his or her identity or persona, for 
which he or she has “an economic interest . . . akin to that of” a commercial trademark holder. 
Likewise, the Lanham Act also protects distinctive attributes, such as a singer's voice or a 
celebrity's physical appearance.23  When analyzing the likelihood of confusion factors in Lanham 
Act cases involving celebrities, courts examine the “level of recognition that the celebrity enjoys 
                                                          
20 See 15 U.S.C.S. 1125(a)(1) (2012) 
21 See United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 90 (“The resulting confusion [due to different organizations employing the 
same trade name to endorse candidates] would be catastrophic; voters would have no way of understanding the 
significance of an endorsement or position taken by parties of recognized major names.”); Browne v. McCain, 611 
F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Indeed, the [Lanham] Act's purpose of reducing consumer confusion 
supports application of the Act to political speech, where the consequences of widespread confusion as to the source 
of such speech could be dire”). 
22 See Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ. Co., 173 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1999). 
23 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding Section 43(a) recognizes false 
endorsements claims “premised on the unauthorized imitation of an entertainer's distinctive voice” or physical 
appearance). 
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among members of society” to determine the “strength of the plaintiff's mark.”  Likewise, the 
“relatedness or proximity of the products” refers to “the reasons for or source of the plaintiff's 
fame.”  Once a question of confusion can be validly raised under such tests as Sleekcraft, courts 
tend to allow a jury determine if confusion is likely.24 
The most important recent case regarding § 43(a) was Henley v. DeVore.25  This case 
brought a vaiety of copyright and trademark claims but for our purposes we will focus on the 
evaluation of § 43(a) and the likelihood of confusion in consumers.  In Henley, a founding 
member of The Eagles, Don Henley, filed suit against Charles DeVore, a Republican candidate 
for the U.S. Senate in California, after DeVore posted a video featuring two songs performed or 
written by Henley, “The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” with new lyrics 
by DeVore.26  The court determined that the plaintiff could not maintain a Lanham Act claim 
based merely on the use of songs that Henley performed, noting that there is no precedent to 
support the proposition that a performer holds a trademark on the performance of a particular 
song. The court determined that since the public could not reasonably think that Henley 
himself actually performed the DeVore campaign video songs, defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim.27 
On August 5, 2010, it was announced that Henley and DeVore reached a confidential 
settlement in this case. As part of the settlement terms, DeVore issued a statement apologizing to 
Don Henley and his fellow songwriters for using their song “without respect for their rights 
under copyright law.” In an interview discussing the settlement, Henley insisted that the lawsuit 
                                                          
24 White v. Samsung Electronics, 971 F.2d 1395 
25 See Henley v. Devore, 733 F.Supp.2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
26 See Clarida and Sparkler, supra note 1, at 10-1. 
27 Id. at 11. 
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was not filed to make a political statement, but rather was “simply a matter of my copyrights 
being violated by music being used in a way it was never intended to be used.”28 
Under this examination we can see there is a high standard to be met by musicians in 
order to prove an infringement case against a political candidate and their campaign.  An 
evaluating court must first come to the conclusion that a campaign is in fact rendering services 
which would subject the organization to the standards imposed on a commercial body.  Such a 
court would then have to determine whether confusion among the electorate is likely under 
Section 43(a), using a test similar to the Sleekcraft examination.  Finally, a musician would have 
to convince a jury that confusion is likely enough to cause false endorsement.  Even if a musician 
were to reach this point in litigation, there are still complications to overcome. 
C. First Amendment Complications29 
Towering over any claims through either copyright or trademark law are the protections 
afforded candidates through the First Amendment protection on political speech.  In this section 
we will evaluate the influence that the First Amendment has on protecting political speech and 
the direct effects on the likelihood of successfully suing under copyright and trademark law.   
In order to succeed on the merits of either claim, a plaintiff must steer clear of the well-
trodden path of political speech.  The two types of speech that are relevant to disputes involving 
the unauthorized use of intellectual property by political candidates are core political speech and 
commercial speech.  Core political speech relates to public issues, the conduct of government, 
and elections.30  Commercial speech is speech that is “related solely to the economic interests of 
                                                          
28 Id. at 11 
29 See Cursio, supra note 7, at 338-349. 
30 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995)(describing core political speech as 
“[d]iscussion of public issues,” “debate on the qualifications of candidates,” “discussion of governmental affairs,” 
and “conduct of campaigns for political office” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam))). 
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the speaker and its audience.”31  If a defendant is able to differentiate the instance of potential 
infringement of copyright or trademark law as core political speech as opposed to commercial 
speech, the First Amendment will shield a candidate from lawsuits. 
Governmental and judicial restrictions on political speech and campaigns operate in “an 
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities” because the “role that elected officials 
play in our society makes it all the more imperative that they be allowed freely to express 
themselves on matters of current public importance.”32 As the Supreme Court noted in the 
landmark election-law case Buckley v. Valeo, the First Amendment “has its fullest and most 
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”33 Accordingly, 
courts review infringements on core political speech under the highest constitutional standard- 
exacting scrutiny.34  When applying exacting scrutiny, courts will only uphold regulations that 
are “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”35  For commercial speech, the 
Constitution “accords a lesser protection . . . than [it does for] other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression.”36 
In American Family Life Insurance Co. (AFLAC) v. Hagan, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio addressed the distinction between commercial and core political 
speech in the context of a political campaign.37  In Hagan, the campaign of Ohio gubernatorial 
candidate Tim Hagan posted an internet advertisement featuring a “crudely animated character 
made up of [his opponent] Governor Taft's head sitting on the body of a white cartoon duck,” 
                                                          
31 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) . 
32 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002) . 
33 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,  15 (1976). 
34 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law burdens core political speech, 
we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state 
interest.”). 
35 Id.at 347. 
36 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
37 American Family Life Insurance Co. (AFLAC) v. Hagan, 266 F.Supp.2d 682,  695 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
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which quacks “TaftQuack several times during each commercial” (the “Hagan 
Advertisement”).38  The figure in the Hagan Advertisement resembled the well-known quacking 
duck in AFLAC's insurance commercials.39  The Hagan Advertisement also solicited campaign 
donations through an internet link.40  The court held that, for the purposes of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act's exemption on noncommercial uses of trademarks, the solicitation of 
contributions by the Hagan Advertisement was “completely noncommercial political speech.”41  
The court opined that it was “arguable whether Hagan's speech propose[d] a commercial 
transaction at all.”42  Rather, the Hagan Advertisement discussed “public issues and challenge[d] 
the qualifications of a political candidate.”43  Notice this is directly opposed to the United We 
Stand decision referenced earlier regarding the commercial nature of campaigns.  Although a 
political campaign may be viewed as a commercial entity, under the First Amendment, the 
particular use of a trademark, or under 43(a) a celebrity’s persona, must be commercial in nature, 
not political.  If the reviewing court concludes the aim of the statement was political, or at the 
very least partially political, the First Amendment will protect a candidate from a trademark 
claim. 
Before discussing the next case with bearing on the First Amendment and how it colors a 
claim under copyright and trademark law, we will briefly discuss an aspect of trademark law 
which has become closed due to Congress’s reshaping.  In 1995, the Lanham Act was amended 
to include Section 1125(c),  to protect against trademark dilution.44  Dilution is defined as 
“lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and services, 
                                                          
38 Id.at 686 
39 Id.at 686 
40 Id.at 686 
41 Id.at 697 
42 Id.at 697 
43 Id.at 697-698 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). 
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regardless of the presence or absence of--(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark 
and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.”45  This method of 
trademark challenge would have been useful to a musician claiming dilution of his or her 
persona through false endorsement.  However, the original version of the statute has been 
updated to eliminate this possibility.  The current version of the statute protects marks from 
dilution by the “use of a mark… in commerce,” and maintains an exception for noncommercial 
use.46  Thus, “all speech which is not purely commercial, and would therefore be protected by 
the First Amendment, is subject to the exception.”47  This measure protects political speech and 
does not allow even a mixed form of speech, including both commercial and political, from 
being considered under trademark dilution.48  This approach not only closes trademark dilution 
as a possibility to musicians but also can be used as an indication of Congress’ intent to exempt 
political speech from the restrictions of federal law.  It provides further evidence to courts that 
trademark law was not intended to protect political speech. 
In Nader, the S.D.N.Y. found the Hagan court's reasoning to be “persuasive,” holding the 
Nader Advertisement exempt from liability under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act because 
its use of MasterCard's trademarks was political in nature.49 MasterCard argued that the Nader 
Advertisement was commercial in nature because contributions to the Nader campaign increased 
after the internet version of the Nader Advertisement, which contained a “Donate On-line” link, 
was released.50  The court rejected that argument on two grounds.  First, MasterCard provided 
“no evidence of a causal connection between the [Nader Advertisement] and the 
                                                          
45 John Zevitas, If It Doesn't Fit, Keep on Trying?: The Courts' Attempt to Find A Place for Pure Political Speech in 
the Lanham Act, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 243, 274 (2010); quoting 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 (2012). 
46 Id. at 275. 
47 Griffith v. Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (citing Mattel, 296 F.3d at 906). 
48 See American Family Life Insurance Co.,  266 F.Supp.2d at 698. 
49 See Mastercard International Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., No. 00 Civ.6068 (GBD) U.S. Dist. 
WESTLAW 434404, 1 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2004). 
50 Id.at 1. 
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contributions.”51  Alternatively, even if the Nader Advertisement did spur an increase in 
donations to the Nader campaign, the court would have still held that the Nader Advertisement 
was political in nature.52  The court opined that the Nader Advertisement conveyed a “strong 
political message” - Nader's opinion that “other presidential candidates can be bought, but that 
the ‘truth,’ represented by himself, cannot.”53 
The court warned that if it held the Nader Advertisement to be commercial in nature 
solely because the advertisement increased campaign contributions, “all political campaign 
speech would also be ‘commercial speech’ since all political candidates collect contributions.”54  
Such a holding would be inconsistent with the Lanham Act's legislative history, which “clearly 
indicates that Congress did not intend for the Act to chill political speech.”55  The court also 
quoted the following from the legislative history of the Act: “Political advertising and promotion 
is political speech, and therefore not encompassed by the [Lanham Act's] term ‘commercial.”  
Accordingly, viewing this case as analogous to Hagan, the court held that the Nader 
Advertisement use of MasterCard's trademarks was political in nature.56  The court further 
supported its finding that the Nader Advertisement was political in nature in its fair use analysis, 
opining that the Nader Advertisement's stated purpose was to “raise public awareness of Ralph 
Nader's desire to be included in the upcoming televised Presidential candidate debates.”57  
 Affirmative defenses are an important aspect of First Amendment law to keep in mind 
during this evaluation.  The most easily and frequently invoked is fair use.58  Fair use permits the 
                                                          
51 Id. at 7. 
52 Id. at 8. 
53 Id. at 8. 
54 Id. at 9. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 Id. at 8. 
57 Id. at 8. 
58 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1992). 
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use of protected works for certain purposes, such as criticism, commentary, research, and news 
reporting.59  The statute provides: 
[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include--(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.60 
Briefly, (1) looks to whether the use is commercial (2) the degree to which the work is creative 
or factual (3) amount of work used (4) if such a use would harm the market for plaintiff’s work, 
such as licenses.61  This defense could be used by politicians as a means to invoke the First 
Amendment protections.  This is yet another analysis an evaluating court would have to perform 
to conclude the limits of First Amendment protections.  It can be an effective defense from a 
claim but once again arguments in our context can be made.  We are dealing with the use of 
works, recorded songs, which we argue are commercial in nature because there is no element of 
a political message, are entirely creative, used to the degree of recognition by and audience, and 
are subject to market forces due to licensing. 
Although these cases cast a bleak pallor on a potential lawsuit challenging the use of a 
protected song due to the First Amendment’s protection of political speech, a difference can be 
drawn from the context of our investigation.  These cases dealt with the use of a trademark in 
order to make a direct statement pertaining to a politician’s message.   The examining Courts in 
these cases refuse to consider such use as commercial for good reason, because all political 
speech by a campaign is inherently aimed at fostering support and donations for a candidate.  
                                                          
59 See Claridia and Sparkler, supra note 1, at 8 
60 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1992). 
61 See Clarida and Sparkler, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
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However, as we will discuss later in Parts II and III of this discussion, the use of recorded music 
does not meet this standard.  The use of music in the context of political campaign rallies says 
nothing about a politician’s message and is therefore not political speech. 
i. First Amendment's Impact on the Copyright Act62 
The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are “intuitively in conflict” because of 
the contrary interests that they protect.63  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, however, the Supreme Court 
explained that free speech protections are embodied in copyright law. 64  Because the First 
Amendment and Copyright Clause were adopted within a few years of each other, the Court 
reasoned that the Framers viewed “copyright's limited monopolies” to be “compatible with free 
speech principles.”65  The Court further explained that copyrights promote free expression and 
dissemination of ideas by “establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression.”66 
Additionally, the Court identified the Copyright Act's “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations.”67 The Copyright Act precludes copyright ownership of ideas, facts and 
concepts while protecting the expression of such ideas, facts and concepts, which is known as the 
“idea/expression dichotomy.”68 The idea/expression dichotomy “strikes a definitional balance 
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts 
while still protecting an author's expression”; it allows the ideas, theories and facts behind 
copyrighted works to be “instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of 
publication.”69 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the fair use defense protects the First 
                                                          
62 See Cursio, supra note 7, at 342-44. 
63 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001).  
64 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003). 
65 Id. at 188.  
66 Id .at 190. 
67 Id .at 190. 
68 Id. at 190. 
69 Id. at 190. 
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Amendment rights of copyright users, “allow[ing] the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.”70 
This notion of a dichotomy between idea and expression is incredibly important to our 
argument.  Especially in the context of candidates using music with patriotic imagery, are they 
not using the expression of another to transmit their message or idea?  Candidates should be free 
to express the ideas contained within a song but the direct expression of these ideas is the 
property of a musician.   
In summary, after our examination of copyright law and the First Amendment, it seems 
that should a cause of action arise under copyright law, the First Amendment may not stand in 
the way of a musician attempting to sue for infringement.  If a musician were able to argue a 
cause of action arising under moral rights, which currently does not exist, they would likely 
succeed.  We will evaluate this further in Part II and III.   
ii. First Amendment's Impact on the Lanham Act71 
The First Amendment can provide a defense to a Lanham Act claim in a case involving 
the unauthorized use of a trademark in a similar manner as copyright.  Though the unauthorized 
use of a trademark in political speech does not preclude Lanham Act liability per se, the Lanham 
Act should not be used to “chill political speech.”72 For trademark dilution claims in particular, 
political speech is fully protected because the Federal Trademark Dilution Act specifically 
excludes noncommercial uses of trademarks from liability.73 
                                                          
70 Id. at 190. 
71 See Cursio, supra note 62, at 344-50. 
72 See Mastercard International Inc., WESTLAW 434404 at 7 (“The legislative history of the Lanham Act clearly 
indicates that Congress did not intend for the Act to chill political speech.”); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989)  (“Because overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on 
First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.”).  
73 See MasterCard Int’l, Inc., WESTLAW 434404 at 7. 
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As a threshold matter, the First Amendment only provides a defense to a Lanham Act 
claim if the alleged infringer used the trademark to convey a communicative message, not if the 
alleged infringer used the trademark for source identification.74  To determine if enforcing the 
Lanham Act violates the First Amendment  rights of the alleged infringer, courts generally apply 
one of three tests: (1) the “likelihood of confusion” test; (2) the “alternative avenues” test; or (3) 
the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, which is commonly known as the Rogers or “artistic relevance” 
test.75 The federal circuit courts are split as to which test is the proper method for balancing First 
Amendment and trademark interests, and the Second Circuit has even applied more than one 
test.76 
Under the likelihood of confusion test, courts apply a standard likelihood of confusion 
analysis, such as evaluating the Polaroid or Sleekcraft factors, without a separate First 
Amendment analysis.77  Under the alternative avenues test, enforcing the trademark holder's 
Lanham Act rights does not violate the First Amendment when there are “sufficient alternative 
means” of communication available.78  Courts that apply the alternative avenues test view 
trademarks as property rights that need not “yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights 
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.”79  Those 
courts reason that, if alternative means of communication are available, neither the speaker nor 
the public are deprived the benefit of the speaker's ideas.80  
                                                          
74 See United We Stand America, Inc. 128 F.3d at 92-3. 
75 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d at 448-9. 
76 See Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, A Celebrity Balancing Act: An Analysis of Trademark Protection under the 
Lanham Act and the First Amendment Artistic Expression Defense, 99 NW. U. L. REV 1817, 1830  (2005). 
77 Id. at 1828. 
78 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d at 448. 
79 See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987). 
80 Id. at 402. 
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The seminal case for the alternative avenues test is Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.81   In Lloyd 
Corp., anti-war protesters were ejected from a privately-owned shopping mall after they tried to 
distribute anti-war handbills.82  Holding that there was no constitutional violation, the Court 
introduced the fundamental principle of the alternative avenues test.83  The Court explained that 
infringing on the mall owner's property rights while the protesters had sufficient alternative 
means to exercise their First Amendment rights “would diminish property rights without 
significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.”84  The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit 
to have adopted the alternative avenues test as its standard for evaluating First Amendment rights 
in Lanham Act disputes.85 
The alternative avenues test would almost certainly result in an outcome favorable to 
suing musicians.  An evaluating court would be forced to view a candidate’s use of recorded 
music as a violation of trademark law because there are alternative avenues through which to 
communicate their message.  If a candidate could successfully argue that playing a song 
constitutes political speech, then certainly there are alternative avenues through which that 
message can be dispersed than through the playing of a protected song.   
The First, Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have either rejected or significantly limited 
the alternative avenues test because, inter alia, (1) the test does not sufficiently protect the right 
to free expression, (2) trademark and real property rights should not be analogized for the 
purpose of balancing property rights with First Amendment rights and (3) the test could require a 
court to critically evaluate creative necessity.86   In Parks v. LaFace Records, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                          
81 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) 
82 Id. at 553. 
83 Id. at 567. 
84 Id. at 567. 
85 Id. at 568. 
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rejected the alternative avenues test.   The court noted the “awkwardness of analogizing property 
rights in land to property rights in words or ideas.”87  For a communicative message, a change in 
wording is usually much more significant to the overall message's effectiveness than a difference 
in the location from which the message is communicated.88  Furthermore, applying the 
alternative avenues test to a Lanham Act dispute would require a court to evaluate whether the 
unauthorized use of a trademark is “necessary” to communicate an idea, which according to the 
Parks court, is an inappropriate evaluation for the judiciary to make.89 
Finally, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits and the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania have adopted the Rogers test to determine if the Lanham Act's restrictions apply to 
an artistic work.90  The Rogers test only permits the Lanham Act to preclude the use of a 
trademark in a work that contains artistic expression when “the public interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”91   Accordingly, the 
Lanham Act will only apply when (1) the use of the trademark has “no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work” or (2) if the use of the trademark has artistic relevance, that use “explicitly 
misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”92  The Rogers court limited the test to cases 
arising in the “context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name,”93 but courts have 
since expanded its scope to cover any work of artistic expression.94  After rejecting the likelihood 
of confusion and alternative avenues tests, the Parks court applied the Rogers test, opining that it 
                                                          
87 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d at 450 
88 Id. at 450. 
89 Id. at 450. 
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91 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 998. 
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is the “most appropriate method to balance the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
with the public interest in free expression.”95 
As we can see, the differences in the tests applied to the First Amendment question and 
trademark law vary greatly.  The most favorable to musicans would likely be the alternative 
avenues test.  However, the Rogers test could also be determined in favor of musicians.  Again, 
we would have to look at how a song is used by a candidate.  Even if the first part of the test 
were successful, proving that the use explicitly misleads is the central problem under a 43(a) 
claim.  There is little evidence a candidate uses an artist’s music to intentionally confuse the 
electorate as to the source or endorsement of an artist.   
In summary, should a cause of action be raised under §43(a), it is unclear if the First 
Amendment would protect a political candidate.  The examples we have use are largely 
commercial in nature and so the context we investigate has not been tested.  Of the three tests to 
evaluate the First Amendment’s protection of candidates, the alternative avenues test would 
likely prove most favorable to musicians.  However, only the Eighth Circuit applies this test and 
the others will be hesitant to expand its’ application.   
II.Evaluation of Incentives Under the Net Benefit Theory 
 In order to determine if a change to a law should be made, we must evaluate the costs 
related to such a change.  Such a change would involve an increase in the level of protection or 
the rights granted to a musician.  Such changes could be enacted through different means, which 
will be discussed in Part III.  Several theories of evaluation exist but we will utilize one 
economic theory known as the net benefit principle.  This theory dictates that “An increase in 
exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only when the value of increased creative 
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activity resulting from increased incentives is greater than the value of the benefits lost from 
reduced access.”96    
By utilizing this principle, we are free to consider more intangible incentives.  This will 
greatly help our evaluation since many of the considerations in this situation are non-monetary or 
undisclosed due to private settlements of disputes.  We will compare the value of the benefits 
gained by candidates from an increase in access to recorded music against the decreased creative 
activity by artists resulting from decreased incentives.  However, since the American system of 
intellectual property is not concerned with moral rights, only economic, we will introduce a 
modified net benefit evaluation which takes into account these rights. 
The benefits resulting from the increased access to recorded music that candidates 
currently enjoy is minimal.  Although the courts may view the use of recorded music at 
campaign appearances as protected core political speech, the reality is that their core message  is 
not enhanced by the music or hindered by its absence.  The benefit candidates gain by using 
recorded music is the associative value.  Campaign appearances are not performed merely to 
reiterate a candidate’s platform but rather to include a degree of showmanship in order to excite 
the public.  This can be done by building into a candidate’s message an association through 
music on several levels, which depend on the song selected.  The uses we will postulate mirror 
the uses an evaluating court could determine when utilizing any of the tests mentioned above. 
First, a song could be chosen to excite the crowd.  It is in the candidate’s interest to have 
an excited crowd, which would be facilitated by playing loud or fast music.  An excellent 
example of this is Sarah Palin’s use of the song Barracuda.  A loud and fast song would excite 
the crowd, which in turn would tend to increase the amount of cheering at a campaign 
appearance, which increases the perception of a candidate’s popularity, not only for the crowd in 
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attendance but also for television audiences.  This use yields minimal benefit to a candidate 
beyond traditional showmanship.   
Second, a song could be chosen for its associative imagery.  An example of this is Ronald 
Reagan’s use of the song Born in the USA by Bruce Springsteen.97  By co-opting the patriotic 
imagery of the lyrics, Reagan hoped to portray himself as a candidate who treasured the 
principles of patriotism and working-class sensibilities.  It is unlikely a court would find this use 
objectionable under trademark law because there must be the likelihood of confusion on the part 
of the electorate that the musician endorses a candidate, not that their ideas are similar.   
Another consideration to broad association could be explained by the general, all-
encompassing nature which campaigns draw battle-lines around.  Politics and campaigns appear 
to increasingly draw cultural boundaries when seeking to persuade the electorate.  By this, we 
mean that campaigns have increasingly taken a “with us or against us” pitch, where stereotypes 
and associations can be more important than the direct message a candidate delivers.  An 
example would be candidates playing country music during an appearance, in order to associate 
himself or herself with the cultural boundaries drawn to appeal to a rural audience.  The benefits 
of this use are vague at best, bordering on unconscious, which would be impossible to prove 
causally.  This is unlikely to be considered by an evaluating court because of the lack of clearly 
defined goals and results. 
Lastly, a song could be selected for the purpose of associating a candidate directly with 
an artist and his or her popularity, the direct embodiment of objections and lawsuits brought by 
musicians.  While these are strong benefits, they only serve to augment the candidate and the 
message.  Should an evaluating court determine the use of a song to be as such, the ramifications 
would certainly lead a court to look favorably on a musician’s false endorsement suit.  Such a 
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determination would pass the false endorsement test as well as any of the three First Amendment 
tests for protection from trademark law. 
The benefits experienced by musicians are potentially great, if American intellectual 
property law would consider moral rights.  Musicians create not only as a source of income but 
also as an outlet for self-expression.  Preventing others from co-opting creative and personal 
expression without particular authorization could be of great value to musicians.  While some 
musicians would be pleased with or indifferent to a candidate’s use of their songs, politics 
inherently involves controversial issues and personal choice.  The greatest benefit musicians 
would gain by increased protection would be the embodiment of personal choice in disagreeing 
with the views espoused by candidates of which they disapprove.  While these are not rights 
protected by the law, these are principles held in highest regard by our national principles of self-
determination and free choice.   
When considering the moral rights of musicians, the benefits gained by musicians 
through increased protections outweigh the benefits experienced by lower protections.  Increased 
protection does not necessarily mean the absence of access to candidates.  Depending on the 
nature of any change in law, which will be discussed in the next section, authorization can still 
be granted to candidates, although it would be more challenging to obtain.   
III.Should New Legislation Be Created and How It Could Solve This Problem 
 An evaluation under the net benefit principle indicates that the benefits enjoyed by 
musicians in the case of an increase of protections would outweigh the benefits experienced by 
candidates under the current law with its lower level of protection.  The law discussed above 
does not properly protect the artist from unfair use of music and the association with campaigns 
and viewpoints with which they may disagree.  Copyright claims covered by blanket licensing do 
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not protect the moral rights of musicians.  Trademark claims under false association or 
endorsement seem to be able to succeed, provided several challenges are met.  First, a court must 
determine a political campaign is a commercial body.  Second, there must be a likelihood of 
confusion.  Lastly, the use would have to fail to meet on of the First Amendment tests described 
above in order to be subject to trademark law.  Only then would a false endorsement claim 
succeed.  While it is possible, it is unlikely.   
A new law would have to possible approaches under copyright law:  1) one which holds a 
hard line granting artists total control of their works, prohibiting unauthorized use or 2) a more 
moderate approach, granting special consideration to use in the political realm.  Should a 
candidate use previously recorded music, the artist may sue in a manner similar to that in 17 
USC § 118 which protects synchronization licenses.  Because of the political nature of the use, 
increased audience exposure while highly focused, and potential disagreements in view between 
musician and candidate, an increased fee or penalty should be utilized.  However, using this 
structure crosses a line that American copyright law has been unwilling to brave, the protection 
of moral rights for musicians.  Should this occur, it is unlikely the First Amendment will stand in  
the way of such a claim.  If an evaluating court were to maintain the precedent discussed above, 
the separation of an idea and its expression would yield a positive outcome for musicians.  The 
idea is protected by the First Amendment but not the expression, which would fall under 
copyright protection.  A new law would have to specifically carve out a new realm of coverage 
for musicians under moral rights.  The first option is very unlikely to occur.  The second is 
possible and would need to apply a reasonableness standard to the costs of licenses. 
A new law under trademark law would be a break from the precedent opposing the 
chilling of political speech under the Lanham Act.  A new law under the Lanham Act would 
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likely fall under the false endorsement claim, perhaps carving-out a specific claim for musicians 
whose music has been used in a political context.  Such a carve-out would be unlikely though 
given the historical attitudes towards political speech and trademark law. 
However, although it does not play a role in the net benefit evaluation, the benefits of 
another party should be considered when addressing the idea of potential legislation; the 
government.  The solution to this problem will likely only be found in new legislation.  Any new 
law would have to be passed by a system of government made up of individuals who were at one 
point candidates and very likely will be candidates again in the future.  Therefore, there exists an 
inherent bias against any change in the status quo.  As such, potential legislation would be hotly 
contested.  It is unlikely an elected official would enact restrictions on themselves for what they 
can and cannot do on the campaign trail.  Even if a candidate were able to bargain for 
authorization to play recorded music at a campaign appearance, elected officials would prefer to 
avoid the increase in red tape and bureaucratic difficulties.  Additionally, since most of these 
cases have been brought by liberal leaning musicians against conservative candidates, a political 
firefight would ensue.  Although this would be a powerful motivator for liberal representatives to 
enact laws which would potentially limit the ability of their conservative opponents to run a 
campaign with all the flair and audience appeal liberals would likely still enjoy, the absolute 
freedom to use any music would likely prevent a party-line conflict. 
Finally, we should consider whether new legislation is necessary because of the practical 
outcome these cases have followed in the recent past.  In the most recent election, very few cases 
of candidates using recorded music become contentious due to the pattern of use, followed by 
complaint, followed by disuse which has become prevalent.98  Candidates do not want the bad 
press associated with a musician complaining about or bringing suit over the use of their music.  
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It is easier for a candidate to simply discontinue using a musician’s song.  In light of this, it is 
even more unlikely any change in law will occur. 
  Revisiting our thesis, that current law is insufficient to protect musician and therefore a 
new law should be enacted, we must conclude in the negative.  First, it is not entirely clear a 
false endorsement claim would fail under trademark law.  Although the standard which must be 
met is extremely high, it is possible.  It is also extremely unlikely that a new law would be 
passed by those who would be most directly subject to it, our government representatives.   
Given the small number of people affected, the overwhelming support needed is unlikely to 
materialize. 
